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He is a bright boy and being such he cannot recover from the com-
pany because his mind is not shown to be a child under fourteen.
21
The capacity of the boy is further indicated by the fact that he knew
the meaning of the danger sign upon the enclosure and when ques-
tioned whether he believed that the electricity was off because the gate
was ajar, he replied, "Yes, I did. What child wouldnt?"22 In summary,
the court selected the least flexible approach to reach its result.
Age can be no more than an indication of ability to appreciate a
given risk. A conclusive presumption does not alter the minor's mis-
judgment or his immaturity. Either the rebuttable presumption of no
benefit at age fourteen or the Restatement view, if applied after age
fourteen, would permit the child to present his case. Mentally sub-
normal children, because of their deficiencies, have a particular need
of at least introducing evidence of their failure to comprehend a risk.
The Bentley rule prevents the jury's inquiry into the negligence of the
land possessor, the nature of the condition on the land or any other
facts upon which reasonable men might differ. In a society increasingly
more industrialized and mechanized such an inquiry would seem
critical in many factual situations. The likelihood that negligent acts
by land possessors today would not be appreciated even by normal
children over age fourteen increases with the complexity of conditions
continually being added to land areas.
Howard Downing
ToRTs-NuisAcE-EAONAiBLE USE-Plaintiff brought an action for
damages for diminution of the market value of her home as the result
of an alleged nuisance created by the defendant, an oil refining com-
pany. Since 1928, defendant had been in operation at this location,
which was zoned for heavy industrial use. Technilogical developments
in the industry dictated the defendant's installation of a "platformer-
unifying" unit in 1957. No evidence was produced that the placement
and use of the unit were not accomplished with ordinary prudence and
discretion; however, the unit necessarily produced a composite noise.
Plaintiffs home, in which she had lived since 1950, was in a residential
district across the street from defendant's plant; it was separated by a
distance of 420 feet from the "platformer-unifying" unit. The trial court
entered judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff. Held: Reversed and a
21 Brief for Appellee, p. 6, Bentley v. South-East Coal Co., 334 S.W.2d 349
(Ky. 1960).
22334 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1960). (Emphasis added.) It appears that this
phrase by the child is awkward and unnatural.
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new trial granted. Instructions given by the trial court1 necessarily
assumed as a matter of law either that the use of the refinery property
was unreasonable or that, if reasonable, recovery was nevertheless
allowable if the annoyance to the plaintiff was sufficient to offend a
person of ordinary sensibilities. This instruction did not permit the
jury to weigh the relative circumstances of the parties. In determining
whether such annoyance, if any, was unreasonable, the jury should
have been instructed to take into consideration all of the circumstances
of the case as shown by the evidence, including "the lawful nature and
location of the Company's business; the manner of its operation; the
importance of its business and it's influence on the growth and pros-
perity of the community... ; the kind, volume, time and duration of
the noise; the respective situations of the parties; and the character
and development of the neighborhood or locality in which their proper-
ties are situated."2- Louisville Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181 (Ky.
1960).
The purpose of this comment will be to show how the Kentucky
court has approached the problem of weighing interests when an
annoyance has been created by the reasonable use3 of property.
"Nuisance, which means literally annoyance, may be described as
a wrong done to one by disturbing him in the enjoyment of his property
or in the exercise of a common right. But the term eludes exact defini-
tion... ."4 "Today liability for nuisance may rest upon an intentional
invasion of the plaintiff's interests, or a negligent one, or conduct which
is abnormal and out of place in its surroundings, and so falls fairly
within the principle of strict liability."5
This type of litigation brings into conflict two generally accepted
principles: (1) one must not use his property to the detriment of
another; and (2) one is entitled to a reasonable use of his property.
Of course, when two generally accepted principles come into conflict
the determination should be made by weighing the interests involved,
including those of the community as a whole. The decision must be
made in the light of the deterring or prohibiting effect it may have
upon an industry which is vital to the community, and equal considera-
tion must be given to the burden which may be imposed upon a
property owner's use and enjoyment of his land. If, after weighing all
IThe instructions referred to are not set forth in the court's opnion.
2 Louisville Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 899 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Ky. 1960).
3 "Reasonable use," as employed in this comment, means a use which is
substantially the same as those practices of others engaged in like endeavors and
where reasonable precautions have been taken to avoid the creation of an
annoyance.
4 Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 567, 568 (1934).
5 Prosser, Torts § 70, at 392 (2d ed. 1955).
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of the interests involved, it is determined that the defendant's reason-
able use produces an unreasonable effect upon the plaintiff, then the
annoyance should constitute an actionable nuisance.
The Kentucky court has encountered difficulty in reconciling these
conflicting principles. Emphasizing that one must not use his property
to the detriment of another, one line of cases has apparently made an
erroneous application of the doctrine of strict liability by defining
nuisance in terms of the "effect" which the annoyance has upon the
plaintiff. In an early decision," the court relied exclusively on the
"effect" definition and granted relief for noise and vibrations in the
absence of any allegation as to the nature of the defendant's operations.
Relying mainly on the same basis, the court has granted an injunction
prohibiting the maintenance of a hog pen that caused offensive odors,7
and in a later case indicated that damages could have been awarded
against a city for an annoyance resulting from the location of its pest
house" after explicitly recognizing its necessity and its location in close
proximity to someone's property.
In a few later cases the court stated that reasonable use was not a
defense if an annoyance existed. In abating night operations of a
factory,9 the court stressed that freedom to use property as the owner
sees fit is limited by the effect the operation has on others. In Rogers
v. Gibson,'0 the court, emphasizing that reasonable use was no defense
to an annoyance, stated:
'If a particular use of property causes a nuisance this fact is sufficient
to entitle a person injured thereby to relief. If a nuisance exists, the
fact that due care was exercised and due precautions were taken
against the annoyance or injury complained of, is no excuse. The fact
that the defendant has used the ordinary means to avoid the nuisance
complained of which are used in general by others engaged in the
same business is no defense. A nuisance may be created or main-
tained with the best or highest degree of care.'11
6Wiedman v. Line, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 590 (1892).
7 Philips v. Elizabethtown Butter and Cheese Factory, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 574
(1894).
8 City of Paducah v. Allen, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 3142, 49 S.W. 343 (1899).
Plaintiff could be allowed damages even though the city had made no palpable
abuse of discretion in locating a pest house in close proximity to plaintiff's
property.
9 Wheat Culvert Co. v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 819, 320, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932):
Liberty of action or of using one's own property as he pleases implies
only freedom from arbitrary restraint, and not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. Every
citizen has the right to enjoy the ordinary comforts of human existence, and
is entitled to a remedy or redress when those comforts are disturbed by a
nuisance. That is to be determined or measured by the effect which the act
or condition has upon persons of ordinary health, of normal or average
sensibilities, and of ordinary tastes and habits and mode of living.
10267 Ky. 32, 101 S.W.2d 200 (1937).
'l Id. at 85, 101 S.W.2d at 201.
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In a later case the court reiterated this principle12 by explicitly
stating that even a lawful business prudently operated may constitute
a nuisance for which relief will be granted.
The court in these later cases was correct in stating that reasonable
use in itself is not a defense to the creation of a nuisance. They failed,
however, to recognize that it should be a factor to be taken into con-
sideration. In essence, their determination was based upon the "effect"
the nuisance had upon the plaintiff, and they applied what amounted
to strict liability by disregarding the nature of the defendant's use and
the other interests involved.
As previously stated, relief from a nuisance can be established upon
the doctrine of strict liability; however, the Kentucky court may have
failed to properly recognize the situations in which it should be applied.
Strict liability as applied to nuisance originated in Rylands v.
Fletcher,'3 an English decision. The defendant built a reservoir upon
his land in which large quantities of water accumulated. A defect in
the reservoir allowed the water to escape, causing sudden and unex-
pected damage to the plaintiff's property. Even though the defendant
was not negligent, the court imposed liability for the injury resulting
from the escape of a substance, dangerous to others if it escaped, which
had been brought upon the land of the defendant.
This case is distinguishable from the generally accepted concept of
nuisance on two grounds: (1) The defendant did not intend the con-
sequences of his act; he intended to have the reservoir, but he did not
intend to have the defect which caused the plaintiff's injury. In the
ordinary nuisance case the defendant intends the consequences of his
act.14 (2) The damage was sudden and unexpected. A nuisance is
commonly thought of as continuing for a substantial period of time.
However, even though these distinctions exist, the courts in this
country have applied the doctrine of strict liability to nuisances arising
out of dangerous substances upon the land of the defendant.'5 The
courts have made a further and unjustifiable extension of the doctrine
SwKentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857
(1941), in which the court stated:
There can be no doubt but that commercial and industrial activities which
are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to
the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable.
It is no defense that skill and care have been exercised and the most improved
methods and appliances employed to prevent such result.
13 [1868] 8 H.L. 330.
14 For example, if the defendant's operation produces a noise, he knows or
should know it is substantially certain that the plaintiff can hear it, thus by
operating he intends to produce the consequence that the plaintiff can hear the
noise.
15 2 Harper & James, Torts § 14.1 (1956).
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to nuisances growing out of the operation of a rock crusher's and
smoke,17 carbon,' soot,19 and noxious gases20 from industrial enter-
prises. The consequences in these cases did not involve sudden and
unexpected damage, nor were they caused by inherently dangerous
substances. How can they be reconciled with the Rylands rationale?
Apparently the Kentucky court has also erroneously extended the
doctrine of strict liability. In the Kentucky cases previously discussed,
none of which factually resemble the Rylands case, the court found
liability without considering either negligence or intention, which are
the only other bases of liability for a nuisance.
In direct conflict with this handling of the problem, another line
of decisions in Kentucky has emphasized the principle that one is
entitled to a reasonable use of his property. In an early decision 1 the
court refused to allow recovery when the plaintiff failed to show that
the noise complained of was other than the usual and ordinary sound
incident to a careful operation. In Indian Ref. Co. v. Berry,22 the court
held that a lawful business prudently conducted must be endured and
its operation will not constitute a nuisance, even though it may
depreciate the value of property or cause annoyance to others. The
court applied the same principle in refusing to grant relief in an
action against a blacksmith shop,23 an undertaking establishment,2 4 a
drive-in theatre,2 5 and a blasting operation.2 6 In a 1953 decision 7 the
court stated that Kentucky law is in accord with the "American Rule,"
i.e., the doing of a lawful thing in a careful and prudent manner will
not constitute a nuisance.28
In this line of decisions the court was apparently attempting to
escape the harshness of the strict liability doctrine. In Rogers v. Bond
Bros.,2 9 the court stated that the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher had
been expressly rejected in Kentucky. These decisions, rejecting the
doctrine, allowed the pendulum to swing too far and succeeded only
in shifting the hardship from the defendant to the plaintiff.
1.6 Gilbert v. Davidson Constr. Co., 110 Kan. 298, 203 Pac. 1113 (1922).
17Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306 (1924).
's8 Columbian Carbon Co. v. Tholen, 199 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
19 King v. Columbia Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945).2 0 Bohan v. Port Tervis Gas Light Co., 122 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246 (1890).
21 Hughes v. General Elec. Light and Power Co., 107 Ky. 485, 54 S.W. 723
(1900).
22266 Ky. 123, 10 S.W.2d 630 (1928).
23 Morris v. Roberson, 137 Ky. 841, 127 S.W. 481 (1910).
24 L. D. Pearson & Son v. Bonnie, 209 Ky. 396, 272 S.W. 375 (1925).25 City of Somerset v. Sears, 313 Ky. 784, 233 S.W.2d 530 (1950).
26 Williams v. Codell Constr. Co., 253 Ky. 166, 69 S.W.2d 20 (1934).
2 7 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953).
281d. at 468.
29 279 Ky. 239, 130 S.W.2d 22 (1939).
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Unjustifiable decisions might be made by an application of either of
these principles established in Kentucky. This possibility is illustrated
by the principal case. If the decision had been based upon the
plaintiff's contention that the "effect" upon him should be the sole
determining factor, then the court would have disregarded the fact
that the defendant was prudently conducting a lawful business in a
locality zoned exclusively for his type of business. The consequences
to the defendant and to the community that might result from such
a decision would also have been disregarded. On the other hand, if
the decision had been made by accepting the defendant's contention
that a reasonable use of the property should be an absolute defense
in an action of nuisance, then any degree of damage to the plaintiff
would be irrelevant.30
These untenable positions of the Kentucky court in the past have
apparently arisen as a result of its attempt to segregate the defendant's
acts from the effect they have upon the plaintiff. In an action of
nuisance it should be determined in light of all the circumstances
whether the defendant's reasonable use was not, in fact, unreasonable
in view of the effect it has upon the plaintiff.
The court in the present case has taken a wise step in refusing to
say, as a matter of law, who shall bear the burden when an annoyance
is created by the reasonable use of property. By taking into considera-
tion the reasonableness of the defendant's act and the effect which it
has upon the plaintiff with all other existing circumstances of the
particular litigation, society itself will determine the just disposition
of the burden.
Lowell T. Hughes
30 California has attempted to solve the problem by statute. Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § 71a (Deering 1959) provides:
Whenever any city, city and county, or county shall have established zones
or districts under authority of law wherein certain manufacturing or com-
mercial or airport uses are expressly permitted, except in an action to abate
a public nuisance brought in the name of the people of the State of California,
no person or persons, fir or corporation shall be enjoined or restrained by
the injunctive process from the reasonable and necessary operation in any
such industrial or commercial zone or airport of any use expressly permitted
therein, nor shall such use be deemed a nuisance without evidence of the
employment of unnecessary and injurious methods of operation. Nothing in
this act shall be deemed to apply to the regulation and working hours of
canniers, fertilizing plants, refineries, and other similar establishments whoseoperation produce offensive odors.
Is this a more desirable way of handling the problem? Can a statute successfully
handle a concept which is so dependent upon the needs of an expanding society?
